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IN THE SAME WAY THAT THIS ONE IS: 
SOME COMMENTS ON DOTSON 
 
GRAHAM PRIEST 
 
 
In her paper ‘How is this Paper Philosophy?’1 Kristie Dotson discusses the nature of 
philosophy – or at least, the way that it is practiced – and recommends changes that 
would make it less alienating for much of the profession. I agree wholeheartedly with 
the spirit of her views.  In what follows, I will disagree with some of the things she 
says (principally with some of her comments on me), but most of what I say can be 
seen as articulating the marked points of agreement. 
 
1. PHILOSOPHY AND ITS INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
 
First, I would distinguish between philosophy and the way in which it is 
institutionalized. Dotson starts her paper with a quotation form Anita Allen, asking 
‘What does philosophy have to offer a black woman?’ My answer would be ‘The 
same as it has to offer anyone else’: it can enrich their perspectives on life, make 
them less gullible, give them intellectual pleasure, allow them to critique obsolete 
ideas and regressive social conditions, and so on. 
  This is not really what Allen was asking, however. Her point was that, given the 
way that philosophy is institutionalized today, the profession of philosophy offers 
little to a black woman looking for a profession.  The way that philosophy is currently 
institutionalized is also Dotson’s concern. For her, this embodies a certain conception 
of what philosophy is, which is limiting, and even repressive. 
  Next, I think it wise to remember that philosophy has been institutionalized in 
different ways at different times.  Thus, for example, most contemporary philosophers 
are university academics. But this tradition goes back at most to Germany in the 18
th
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century, and, in English-speaking countries, just over 100 years. Indeed, even in the 
present time, it is institutionalized in different ways in different countries.  Thus, the 
institutional structures are rather different in France, Japan, and India, from what it is 
in the US. Even in English-speaking countries, such as Australia, matters are not 
exactly the same, though they are certainly more similar.  What things are on the 
agenda, what is taken for granted, what is expected of philosophers, matters of race 
and gender, all change from place to place. In what follows I will restrict my remarks 
to the present and to the US, as does Dotson. 
 
2. CONFORMING TO ORTHODOXY 
 
All professions have gate-keepers. To a certain extent this is necessary to keep out 
charlatans and pretenders.  But gate-keeping can go badly wrong, especially when the 
gate-keepers exclude people who have a legitimate perspective on matters which 
disagrees with their own – when the gate-keepers let in, so to speak, not all legitimate 
traders, but just the members of their own club. Such an orthodoxy is unhealthy.  And 
such it is at present in philosophy according to Dotson. I think that Dotson is largely 
right about this. 
  I am not qualified to comment on the race/gender issue. But let me give a couple 
of other examples which are salient to me. The first is mentioned by Dotson herself: 
Asian Philosophy. In fact, there are many interesting, profound and radically different 
Asian philosophical traditions (Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism); Asian 
philosophy is not a monolith.
2
 But it must be said that most trained philosophers 
know nothing of these. They were not taught them, and so do not teach them. 
(Clearly, the situation is self-reproducing.) Worse than this, though, the orthodox 
attitude (at least till recent times) has been that these areas are not philosophy at all: 
they are religion, mysticism, oracular pronouncements.
3
  It must be said that this is a 
view that can be held only out of ignorance. One cannot start to read and understand 
the texts involved without seeing that they are rich in philosophical views, criticisms, 
and debates. 
  Fortunately, then, this view is slowly changing.  But it is still the case that few 
departments teach these areas.  And most departments appear to be unworried by the 
fact that they are missing half of the world’s philosophy. Check the adverts in Jobs 
for Philosophers, for example. I always advise PhD students who want to write their 
thesis on a topic in Asian philosophy that they must be able to sell themselves in other 
areas as well; otherwise they are unlikely to get jobs.  Whether this is intended or not, 
the situation is most unhealthy gate-keeping. 
  It might be thought that gate-keeping of this kind does not infect hard-core 
analytic subjects, such as logic. It does. Paraconsistent logics, that is, those logics in 
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which contradictions do not imply everything, were first developed in the 1960s and 
70s. I have watched their progress since this time with interest. They are now 
accepted by communities in computer science and mathematics. (For example, they 
have their own code in the 2010 Mathematical Subject Classification employed by  
Mathematical Reviews and the Zentralblatt für Mathematik.)  But, though again the 
attitude is slowly changing, it is still the case that this branch of logic, and the 
philosophical ideas which are embedded in it, are largely anathema in philosophy. If 
the logics were obviously philosophically or technically flawed this would be 
acceptable. But they are not. The response of the orthodox philosophical community 
has been, at best, one of ignoring the ideas or dismissing them with a cavalier remark 
betraying a lack of thought; and at worst, one of outright hostility and even ridicule.
4
 
  I am certainly not suggesting that discrimination on the grounds of  being an 
Asian philosopher or paraconsistent logician has been as damaging to people as 
discrimination as  on the grounds of race and gender. That would obviously be false. I 
cite these examples simply to widen the ambit of Dotson’s critique. There is an 
interesting sociology of our profession to be written on these matters. I hope that, one 
day, written it will be.
5
 
 
3. JUSTIFICATION AND A CULTURE OF PRAXIS 
 
Dotson suggests that we might improve the situation in philosophy by replacing the 
current regime – in which anyone who wants to be taken seriously by the profession 
must justify their work against the accepted standards of orthodoxy – with a “culture 
of praxis”.6 According to her, such a culture has two features (17): 
 
1) Value placed on seeking issues and circumstances pertinent to our living, 
where one maintains a healthy appreciation for the different issues that will 
emerge as pertinent among different populations. 
2) Recognition and encouragement of multiple canons and multiple ways of 
understanding disciplinary validation. 
 
Explaining 1), Dotson says (24): ‘the first component of a culture of praxis is a value 
placed on seeking issues and circumstances that are pertinent to our living’.  This 
sounds too narrow to me: it would appear to restrict philosophy to matters in ethics, 
social and political philosophy. This is an important part of philosophy; but only a 
part. Philosophy also concerns itself with many matters, including (sometimes 
technical) issues in the philosophy of physics, mathematics, the philosophy of mind, 
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and so on. One would hardly want to rule these things out.  But maybe Dotson does 
not mean this. At another place she glosses this condition as (17): ‘investigations that 
contribute to old, new, and emerging problems, discussions and/or investigations’.  
This clearly does not limit philosophy in the same way. (So maybe ‘live matters’ 
would be better than ‘life matters’?) And understood like this, I entirely agree with 
her. Philosophy should be continuously engaged with the new problems that are 
thrown up by science, politics, art, religion, or whatever. In fact, one does not have to 
know much about the history of philosophy to know that new problems posed by 
these areas  have been its life blood. This is not, of course, to say that old problems 
are not worth engaging in as well. It is just to say that philosophy should not become 
fossilized. 
  The second condition is a little trickier. Multiple theories and views are necessary 
for healthy philosophy (which is not to say that all views are of equal value, or that all 
philosophising is equally good). I have no disagreement with this point. (I will return 
it in a moment.) But Dotson counter-poses her suggested approach to philosophy with 
a regrettable “culture of justification”. I think that this is not the best way to put the 
point. It might be taken to suggest that philosophers should not try to justify their 
views. Such, I take it, would be a mistake. It is in the testing of a view against others 
that it proves its mettle. This involves attempting to justify it. Philosophy is not just 
about thinking up new ideas, problem solutions, etc. One needs to have one’s 
evaluative/critical faculty fully engaged. Dotson, indeed, acknowledges as much (18): 
‘It is true that valuing the contribution of one’s works as part of a culture of praxis 
does not move us entirely away from methods of justification…’;  (19) ‘I take a 
culture of praxis to be calling for better applications of justifying norms in a way that 
also distributes the burden of making changes’. 
  What Dotson is really against, I think, is having to fit philosophical ideas in with 
the justifications required by orthodoxy – with the insistence that only orthodoxy is 
really philosophy. Such legitimates both a certain kind of philosophy and a regime of 
power that enforces it.  I agree with her on this. As history shows, orthodoxy is rarely 
right. Forcing philosophy to fit into such a straightjacket is a prime way of preventing 
philosophical (and social) progress. 
 
4. PHILOSOPHY AS CRITIQUE 
 
Finally, to the topic of Dotson’s critique of my own account of the nature of 
philosophy.
7
 In Section 6.1 Dotson gives a fair summary of my own view of 
philosophy. The nature of philosophy is essentially unrestricted critique: everything is 
fair game for challenging and questioning. This does not mean that we should not 
invent and explore new views: quite the contrary.  Critique is at it most powerful it 
the light of rival theories.
8
 (Neither is this to say that all philosophers must be 
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8
 The view should not be confused with what Moulton 1996 calls the ‘Adversary Paradigm’ in 
philosophy, where, as in a court of law, the main aim is simply to knock down one’s opponent. I 
emphasize here also that  critique is of ideas, not people. My view is no endorsement of point-scoring, 
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primarily critics.) There can obviously be a professional division of labour between 
those who critique and those who build the different views which make critique bite. 
(See Priest 2006, 206.) 
    After summarizing my view, she explains why she takes it to be at odds with 
hers.
9
 My account sits happily with her point 1). She says herself that (25): 
 
Priest’s account is far easier [than Lourde’s] to reconcile with the value of 
seeking “live” questions. Priest at no point in his article specifies a body of 
relevant questions. Hence the creation of a single body of  appropriate 
problems and/or questions seems to be antithetical to his approach. 
 
Indeed so. Life, in the widest sense, is always throwing up new questions and issues. 
They are all grist to the philosopher’s mill. 
  The problem that Dotson sees is, rather, with point 2). She explains (26): 
 
Now, where his position might appear irreconcilable to the second components 
of a culture of praxis is whether Priest is committed to a single method of 
disciplinary validation, i.e., discernable critique. This is where the culture of 
praxis idea might appear to be incompatible with Priest’s definition. 
 
What is meant here by ‘validation’? Earlier in the essay Dotson distinguishes between 
justification – which is a form of legitimation – and validation, as follows (7, fn. 3): 
 
It bears noting that I see a difference between process of legitimation and 
process of validation. Legitimation takes as a sign of positive status 
congruence with dominant patterns and standards, where validation refers to 
evaluative processes more broadly. Validation, here, refers broadly to all 
processes aimed at establishing the soundness of some belief, process, and/or 
practice as such. Like legitimation, validation is an evaluative concept, but it is 
not confined to evaluation according to some accepted patterns and standards. 
In accordance with this distinction, legitimation is a kind of validation insofar 
as it attempts to establish the soundness or corroborate a practice. Yet 
legitimation is not the sole form of validation available. 
 
Now, critique, it is true, can be seen as a method of validation in a certain sense. 
Surviving critique, does, after all, serve to support a theory. But it is not the case that 
there is only one right way of critiquing a view. The methods of Plato, Aquinas, 
Hume, Nietszche, Schlick, and Derrida (to say nothing of Asian traditions) are 
                                                                                                                                           
putting down those with whom one disagrees, and so on. (See Priest 2006, 207.) Such an attitude is, in 
fact, detrimental to genuine and productive critique.  
9
 She also flags another possible criticism of my view which might be raised (23), to the effect that 
permanent critique may paralyse action. This is no part of the view at all. All views are provisional in a 
certain sense. We need to act on them none the less. 
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obviously radically distinct. Any  way of critique that is cognitively cogent falls 
within my definition.
10
 
  Immediate after raising her concern, Dotson appears to pull back a little (26): 
 
Answers to the question, “what is philosophy,” like Priest’s definition, imply a 
delimiting perspective on disciplinary engagement. However, this is only an 
implication. It actually becomes a delimiting perspective if we take Priest to be 
offering a universalizable definition of philosophy, i.e., critique as a univocally 
justifying norm. That is to say, within a culture of justification that admits one 
set of justifying norms, Priest’s account of philosophy as critique could easily 
become a constrictive definition of philosophy. 
 
Well, I do take critique to be a defining feature of philosophy. But it seems to me that 
this is as much a limitation as moving your body is a limitation on communicating. 
There are many ways of communicating (speaking, writing, sign language, even 
blinking), but they all use the body in some way. Similarly, the fact that philosophy 
involves critique necessarily limits philosophy in no way whatever. Any account of 
philosophy, unless it be entirely vacuous, is going to put some constraints on what 
counts as philosophy. Indeed, Dotson’s account is absolutely no different in this 
regard. And if anything is to be ruled out in philosophy, it is surely the mindlessness 
of blind, uncritical, acceptance, more at home in religion and political ideology than 
in  thoughtful investigation. Indeed, such activities can hardly be called investigations 
at all. 
  I add, also, that I do not expect my account of philosophy to be taken as a piece of 
dogma, any more than any other part of philosophy.
11
 It is as critiqueable as anything 
else in philosophy. A fortiori it cannot constrain and ossify the subject. 
 
5. A RAPPROCHEMENT? 
 
Having said this, it is not clear to me that Dotson and I disagree all that much.
12
 She 
thinks, if I may put it in my own words, that my account of philosophy is 
unacceptable only if it is wielded by an entrenched and elite orthodoxy in such a way 
as to become unduly constrictive. I agree that it should not be so taken. For my part, I 
see no reason to disagree with what she says about philosophy – or at least my 
understanding of her thoughts. It is but an aspect of things which I take to be more 
fundamental. 
  Indeed, it seems to me that Dotson’s paper itself fits into precisely the definition 
of philosophy which I have given. She provides a critique of a certain 
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 The adjectival phrase here is meant to rule out personal abuse, bribery, deceptive advertising, etc., 
which may all be very effective at a personal level.  
11
 See Priest 2006, 207. The question ‘What is philosophy?’ is of course itself a philosophical question. 
12
 Much of what she is reacting against, is, I think, the negative connotations of the term ‘critique’. She 
suggests (in correspondence) that ‘scrutiny’ is a term she can live with. So can I: the definition of 
philosophy given in Priest 2006 is actually as follows (202, italics original): ‘[P]hilosophy is precisely 
that intellectual inquiry in which anything is open to critical challenge and scrutiny’. 
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social/philosophical practice, articulating a different account, and arguing that it is 
preferable. That is exactly what I take philosophy to be. So, how is Dotson’s paper 
philosophy? In that way. In the same way, so is this one. Critique and counter-critique 
go hand in glove. Nor, as I hope I have shown, does critique have to be 
confrontational. With an open-minded spirit, critique helps us all to understand 
better.
13
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